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ABSTRACT
This paper endogenizes coordination problems in organizations by allowing for both ex ante
coordination of activities, using rules and task guidelines, and ex post coordination, using
communication and broad job assignments. It shows that: 
(i) Task specialization and the division of labor is mainly limited by employee discretion, rather than
by the importance of coordination. In particular, specialization is often non-monotonic in the
importance of coordination. 
(ii) Organizations exhibit increasing returns to ex post coordination. This rationalizes discrete `shifts'
in organizational design from very rigid and specialized task assignments, to very flexible
organizations characterized by extensive task bundling, intensive horizontal communication and
substantial employee discretion. 
(iii) Broad task assignments and intensive horizontal communication are complementary. Hence,
lower communication costs often result in less specialization.
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Since Adam Smith (1981), specialization and the division of labor has been at the center
of the organization of production. Whereas most economists share Smith’s view about the
importance of specialization for productivity and economic growth, there is more disagreement
as to what limits the division of labor. In particular, many economists have argued that
the beneﬁts of specialization are mainly limited by the need to coordinate these specialized
activities (Becker and Murphy (1992), Bolton and Dewatripont (1992)), rather than by the
‘extent of the market,’ as proposed by Smith (1981).1
Independently of whether one thinks the key determinant of the degree of specialization
is the extent of the market or the need to coordinate specialized tasks, neither of these two
theories seem to be able to account for recent changes in organizational practices. In particular,
a growing body of empirical and anecdotal evidence has documented a trend towards ‘new
workplace practices’ involving less specialized job assignments, more team work, and more
intensive communication.2 This transformation of the organization of production has occurred
at the same time that globalization has opened up markets and improvements in information
technology have made coordination easier,3 the two forces that are supposed to lead to more
specialization, not less.
This paper departs from the literature by endogenizing the demand for coordination. We
show that this endogeneity is essential in understanding the problem of organizational design
from a theoretical point of view as well as in rationalizing the changes in workplace practices
recently observed. The key idea underlying our arguments is that the demand for coordination
depends on the discretion which employees receive to adapt their tasks to local circumstances.
Concretely, we propose a model in which activities can be coordinated ex ante, by letting em-
ployees stick tightly to rules and task-guidelines, and ex post, using communication and broad
1Also the business literature has identiﬁed and paid considerable attention to this trade-oﬀ. Indeed, according
to Rivkin and Siggelkow (2002) “the [qualitative management] literature is uniﬁed in what it perceives as the
central challenge of organizational design: to divide the tasks of a ﬁrm into manageable, specialized jobs, yet
coordinate the tasks so that the ﬁrm reaps the beneﬁts of harmonious action.” For an early reference on the
statement of the problem see March and Simon (1958, pages 22-30.)
2See, for example Caroli (2001), OECD (1999), Osterman (1994), Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1997), Caroli and
Van Reenen (2001), and Ichniowski, Kochan, Levine, and Strauss (1996). Consistent with this trend towards
less specialized jobs, the biggest management fad of the 1990s, re-engeneering [Hammer and Champy (2001)]
prescribes ‘combining several jobs into one’ and, thus ‘putting back together again the work that Adam Smith
and Henry Ford broke into tiny pieces’ (p.70).
3Information technology improves coordination by lowering communication costs and by allowing a better
and more ﬂexible integration of diﬀerent production processes.
1job assignments. Specialization and the division of labor is then not mainly limited by the
importance of coordination, but instead by the level of employee discretion. Intuitively, orga-
nizations can always perfectly coordinate their activities ex ante by letting employees tightly
stick to some pre-agreed course of action. Alternatively, employees may be given substantial
discretion to tailor their tasks to the local environment. Only in the latter case, specialization
and limited communication result in coordination problems.4
Taking into account the endogeneity of the demand for coordination has important con-
sequences for organizational design. First, task specialization is non-monotonic in task inter-
dependence. Indeed, an increase in the importance of coordination aﬀects two margins. First,
for a given level of employee discretion, it will become more important to improve ex post
coordination by increasing task bundling and improving horizontal communication (Becker
and Murphy (1992)). Second, it will become optimal to constrain employee discretion, reduc-
ing the demand for ex post coordination. Tasks therefore tend to be most broadly deﬁned
for intermediate levels of task interdependence. Indeed, as task interdependence increases
further, organizations increasingly rely on ex ante coordination, where specialized employees
tightly stick to pre-scribed task guidelines. Specialization and the division of labor are then
increasing in the costs associated with the lack of coordination.
A second consequence of the endogeneity of the demand for coordination is that task
specialization is non-monotonic in improvements in communication technology: While better
or cheaper communication allows for a better coordination of specialized tasks (Bolton and
Dewatripont (1992) and Garicano (2000)), organizations take advantage of improvements in
communication technology to boost employee discretion in order to become more adaptive.
This increases the demand for ex post coordination and broader task assignments. In particu-
lar, improvements in communication technology may transform very rigid and very specialized
organizations into ﬂexible organizations characterized by broad task assignments, intensive
horizontal communication and substantial employee discretion.
At h i r da n dﬁnal consequence is that organizations naturally exhibit increasing returns
to coordination, resulting in discrete organizational changes and complementarities between
broad task assignments, intensive horizontal communication and substantial employee discre-
4There is a growing literature (for example, Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Dessein (2002)), which looks
at employee discretion from a contractual perspective: who has decision rights for a particular action. Given
that incentives play no role in our model, there is no need to specify such decision rights. In contrast, employee
discretion is an equilibrium phenomenon: how much do workers adhere to ex ante task guidelines or, in contrast,
tailor their actions to local circumstances.
2tion. Organizations can improve ex post coordination of actions through more task bundling
or through more intensive communication (frequent meetings, team work). We show that this
organizational problem is naturally convex: the better actions are coordinated, the larger are
the incentives to further improve ex post coordination. Intuitively, as ex post coordination
improves it is optimal for the organization to become more adaptive and increase employee
discretion. Conversely, any increase in employee discretion increases the demand for a better
ex post coordination. As a consequence, in the absence of oﬀ-setting increasing costs to ex
post coordination, organizations are either extremely rigid and specialized, and fully rely on
ex ante coordination, or they exhibit substantial employee discretion and rely on extensive
ex post coordination. Even a small change in an exogenous parameter may then result in a
discrete organizational change.
If we do see intermediate levels of specialization, more task-bundling and more intensive
horizontal communication are complementary instruments of ex post coordination.I n t u i t i v e l y ,
the lower the degree of specialization, the better tasks are coordinated ex post and, hence,
the higher the equilibrium level of employee discretion. This, in turn, increases the overall
demand for coordination, making it optimal to also improve the quality of communication
between unbundled tasks. It follows that there will be more task bundling if the organization
can simultaneously improve communication between unbundled tasks. In addition, both in-
struments of coordination move up or down together in response to environmental changes,
yielding a number of unambiguous comparative static predictions.
Related Literature. The theoretical literature studying organizational design originated with
the theory of teams of Marschak and Radner (1972) and, building on this, Cremer (1980).5
Whereas this literature studies the coordination of tasks when specialization implies that in-
formation is necessarily disperse, the present paper is one of very few who endogenizes the
division of labor which causes these coordination problems. Cremer, for example, studies the
optimal grouping of technological interdependent production units, but takes the number of
units which are bundled together as given. A notable exception is Geanokoplos and Milgrom
(1991), who oﬀer a partial characterization of the optimal level of task bundling in a setting a la
Cremer. However, their model, in which managers have limited time to process and collect in-
formation about a number of units, has very diﬀerent implication than ours. In contrast to our
5A strand of this literature is concerned with the optimal design of information processing organizations (e.g.
Radner (1993), Van Zandt (1999), Bolton and Dewatripont (1994), and Vayanos (2003)). With the exception
of Vayanos (2003), these papers focus on situations in which there exist no interdependencies among tasks and,
hence, they are less related to the present paper.
3model, for example, more task uncertainty results in more specialization as collecting informa-
tion is then more important. Another important exception is Garicano (2000), which studies
vertical specialization in knowledge acquisition, that is, what range of problems is solved by
production workers and what range of problems is solved by management. Unlike the present
paper and Cremer (1980), however, there is no need to coordinate the tasks of production
workers or subunits, as there are no interdependencies between problems. As in Geanokoplos
and Milgrom (1991), Garicano’s main focus is on the characteristics of the vertical hierarchy.
Finally, the trade-oﬀ between specialization and coordination is also emphasized in Becker and
Murphy (1992), though they do not consider the endogeneity of the demand for coordination.
In addition, they do not model the sources of the coordination costs that specialization would
bring, nor any form of communication within the parties or the role of management, so their
model has limited organizational design implications. They emphasize instead the impact of
growth in human capital on the extent of specialization.6
Mainly based inductive grounds, the business literature has extensively argued that el-
ements of organizational design and structure are strongly complementary, that is they have
to ‘ﬁt’ with one another. This notion of ‘strategic ﬁt’ was made concrete in the economics
literature by Milgrom and Roberts (1988, 1990), using the mathematics of complementarity
or ‘supermodularity’. Our approach diﬀers from Milgrom and Roberts in that we derive this
complementarity in an explicit model of production, without making any assumptions about
cross-derivatives. In addition, the main focus of Milgrom and Roberts is on elements of man-
ufacturing strategy as opposed to organizational design. For example, Milgrom and Roberts
(1990) focus on the complementarities between the choice of technology, capital investments,
and operating systems.7 A paper which does explicitly analyze complementarities between
elements of organizational design is Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994). Their focus, however, is
on the complementarities between worker discretion, high-performance incentives and worker
ownership of assets.
Outline. The paper proceeds as follows. Section II introduces the model and Section III
analyzes the behavior and performance of a given organizational structure. Section IV then
discuss the implications for organizational design.
6Lindbeck and Snower (2000) is a more recent addition to this literature.
7In an overview paper, Milgrom and Roberts (1995) brieﬂy discuss how some elements of human resource
management policies are related to this modern manufacturing strategy, including horizontal communication
and worker autonomy. They simply outline the assumptions on the cross-derivates of the reduced form proﬁt
function which are suﬃcient and necessary to guarantee the complementarity, however, without motivating these
assumptions.
4In Section V, we oﬀer several extensions of our framework. We ﬁrst investigate the role
of management in the organization of production. Management in our set up updates the
guidelines and rules followed by workers. We show that a large managerial force and extensive
vertical coordination are complementary to extensive task specialization and limited horizontal
communication. To the best of our best knowledge, this is the ﬁrst attempt to simultaneously
analyze vertical and horizontal coordination. Aoki (1985), building on Cremer (1980), sepa-
rately analyzes the eﬃciency of vertical and horizontal coordination of interdependent tasks
and relates these to U.S. and Japanese work-practice. Unlike the present paper, however, his
comparison of these two coordination modes yields no insight as to whether the latter are
complements or substitutes, nor does he endogenize the optimal level of task bundling, and
the extent of specialization.
We then extend the model to account for the interaction between organizational design,
investments in IT and the demand for skills. We model skill as the ability to observe and
process information that is relevant for task execution. We show that the demand for skills is
complementary with broader task assignments and the quality of communication. The same
is true for improvements and investments in information technology, such as data-bases and
expert systems, which increase the ability of agents to adapt to local circumstances.
Finally, we explore alternative modeling choices regarding the nature of communication
and ﬁnd our results robust to these alternative choices.
Section VI relates our results to the mounting evidence on new organizational practices.
Section VII concludes.
II. THE MODEL
In this section, we present a new team theoretic model of production, in which workers
take actions after observing some local information and after having communicated with other
workers involved in production. Organizational design determines the eﬀectiveness of these
actions through its impact on the information structure and productive eﬃciency of workers.
II.A Adaptation and Coordination
Production, in our model, requires the combination of n tasks, where the proﬁts of the
organization depends on (i) how well each task is adapted to the organizational environment
and (ii) how well each task is coordinated with the other tasks.
Adaptation.—T a s ki consists of undertaking a primary action, aii, whose eﬀectiveness depends
on how well it is adapted to the local environment. Thus, adaptation calls for the use of
5local information, which exclusively pertains to a particular task and can only be observed
by the worker assigned to it. This local information, a random variable θi with mean b θ
i
and a common variance σ2
θ, determines the optimal primary action. In particular, to achieve
perfect adaptation, the primary action aii should be set equal to θi. The realization of the local
information is independent across tasks.
Coordination. — In addition, in order to ensure that task i is coordinated with all tasks j 6= i,
t h ee m p l o y e ei nc h a r g eo ft a s ki must perform a string of n − 1 actions
©
ai1,a i2,···,a inª
which are complementary to the primary actions of task j 6= i. In particular, to achieve perfect
coordination between task i and j,a c t i o naij of task i should be set equal to the primary
action ajj.
For instance, if the organization consists of two tasks, then proﬁts are maximized by














where the diagonal elements pertain to the adaptation objective and the oﬀ-diagonal elements
to the coordination objective.
To illustrate our modeling choices consider the design of products and complex systems,
activities where the trade-oﬀs between adaptability and coordination are very prevalent. For
example, coordination problems are particularly daunting in the case of the development of
software projects large enough to be beyond the capabilities of a single software engineer. It
is for this reason that large codes are broken into several modules, each being assigned to a
diﬀerent team. For instance, in the development of proprietary operating system, one module
may be focused on the process manager whereas another is responsible for the network access.
E a c hm o d u l ew i l lh a v ea c t i o n st h a ta r es p e c i ﬁc to its function, the primary actions in our
framework. At the same time though, the modules will have to be combined in one coherent
whole. Software design choices geared towards the harmonious combination of these modules
are the complementary actions in our set up. Uncertainty in software development springs
from its non routine nature. Indeed, most projects are speciﬁcally tailored to the customer’s
needs and each module is likely to encounter peculiarities that are unique to that project.
These peculiarities have to be addressed as the code is being written by the diﬀerent teams
and it is here where the trade-oﬀ between adaptability to the speciﬁc needs of the client and
coordination across teams arises.8
8For a description of the coordination problems in the construction of proprietary operating systems see
6A similar case, taken from Hammer and Champy (2001, page 48), considers product
design at Kodak: ‘In a parallel design process, all the parts are designed simultaneously and
integrated at the end. But this method engenders its own problem: Usually, the subsystems will
not ﬁt together because, even though all the groups were working from the same basic camera
design, changes —often improvements— occurred along the way but were not communicated to
the other groups. Then when the camera is supposed to be ready to go to production, it’s
back to square one in design.’
More generally, the success of organizations depends on how well they can respond to
particular market conditions (demand may be higher or lower than expected,) operational
conditions (a worker may be ill, an unexpected delay may occur), and how eﬃciently it can
customize its products or services to particular consumer characteristics or changing consumer
needs. Typically, the above desire for adaptation will result in coordination problems in the
presence of specialization.
II.B Organizational Design: Task Specialization
An important objective of organizational design is to partition the totality of tasks into
smaller jobs and assign them to speciﬁc individuals or groups. For conciseness, we will think of
the organizational problem as the assignment of jobs to workers. The analysis of the assignment
of jobs to subunits under the direction of a subunit manager, is formally identical.
Each task is assigned to exactly one employee, but an employee may have several tasks
assigned to him. We denote by T (i) the set of tasks bundled with task i. To simplify the
analysis we restrict the organization of production to be symmetric, that is, all workers inside
the organization have an identical number t of tasks assigned to them. That is, we exclusively
consider organizations where t ∈ J =
©




Task variety is costly in the usual specialization sense: as in Adam Smith’s Pin Factory,
the larger the number of tasks assigned to an employee, the lower his degree of specialization
and, as a consequence, the lower his productivity.9 Concretely, the labor cost of carrying out
task i, denoted by h(t,α), is increasing in the level of task bundling t, where the parameter
α governs the returns to specialization. For instance, if a worker performs a broad collection
of tasks it may take him longer to complete them, which is costly for the organization. Alter-
Crowston (1997). The literature devoted to coordination problems in software engineering is large. For example,
see Zmud (1980), Curtis, Crasner, and Iscoe (1988), Kraut and Streeter (1995), Faraj and Sproull (2000) and
the references therein.
9Alternatively, we could assume that task variety reduces the worker’s ability to observe or adapt to the local
conditions, θ
i. We investigate this case in Section VI.
7natively, having broadly deﬁned jobs may require more training or hiring more skilled agents





− h(t,α) > 0 and ∆α > 0 for t,t ∈ J and t>t . (1)
Having introduced our concept of task specialization it is useful to return now to our
modeling choices concerning adaptation and coordination. Workers, as we will see shortly,
can communicate only imperfectly. Hence, in the presence of task specialization, adaptation
to local circumstances puts at risk the harmonious coordination of specialized tasks. This
trade-oﬀ between coordination and adaptation, however, completely disappears if all tasks
are assigned to one worker. Perfect adaptation and coordination can then be simultaneously
achieved.
Another modeling approach would be to only have primary actions which must be
adapted both to local circumstances and to the primary actions of other tasks. This ap-
proach, however, introduces a technological trade-oﬀ between adaptation and coordination,
which is present even in the absence of any division of labor. In our model, this trade-oﬀ
is purely organizational, arising exclusively out of design choices involving specialization and
communication. Introducing technological constraints on adaptation and coordination, would
make the analysis more complicated, but it would not alter the main insight of the paper.
II.C Organizational Design: Communication
To improve coordination between specialized tasks, workers can communicate the choice
of their primary action to other workers prior to its actual implementation. Such communi-
cation, however, will often be imperfect. Some reasons are, for example, the limitations on
employees’ ability to hold unscheduled meetings and the lack of a shared language that facili-
tates the quick transmission of information. As a result, an employee may not understand what
the particular choice of a primary action by another employee implies for the corresponding
complementary action under his control.
In particular, if task i and j are assigned to diﬀerent employees, then with a probability
1−pij, the message concerning the primary action of task i will be pure noise for the employee
in charge of task j. In contrast, with a probability pij, the agent in charge of task j perfectly
understands what the choice of action aii means for the optimal choice of the complementary
action aji.
pji is an organizational design variable and we refer to it as the eﬀectiveness or quality of
the communication channels between two non-bundled tasks i and j. We assume that the cost
8of improving communication between tasks is given by δg
¡
pij¢
where gp > 0,g p (0) = 0,a n d




cost to the organization of having workers engaged in regular meetings, conference calls and
electronic mail conversations, designed to exchange information rather than in production itself.
Similarly, the organization can improve communication channels by job-rotation, team-events
or by hiring employees with knowledge or skills which span across job-boundaries. Given the
symmetry of our model, we can restrict pij = p for all i,j with j/ ∈ T (i) without any loss of
generality.
We assume that communication occurs task-to-task:E v e ni ft a s kj and task k are both
allocated to the same worker and he understands the implications of aii for task j, this does
not imply that he understands what it means for task k. Therefore, the worker in charge of
task i must communicate aii t w i c et ot h eo n ei nc h a r g eo ft a s k j and k, incurring δg(p) twice.
Given a level of task bundling t, the total cost of the organization’s communication network
thus equals
n(n − t)δg(p)
Task-to-task communication is a natural assumption when the way a particular task is
carried out cannot be easily summarized and aﬀects diﬀerent tasks diﬀerently. Communication
in this case focuses on the interface between two tasks. For example, in the case of product
development at Kodak, improvements implemented by the shutter designers are likely to have
diﬀerent implications for the camera body designers and the ﬁlm mechanism designers. For each
task pair, the agents in charge must then discuss how to coordinate these two tasks, incurring
the cost δg(p) along the way. From a theoretical perspective, task-to-task communication has
the appealing feature that the communication costs between two unbundled task i and j are
independent of the degree of specialization.
An alternative assumption, task-to-person communication, might be more appropriate
when tasks are suﬃciently simple such that they can be comprehensively described in a nut-
shell. In this case, an employee who understands what the choice of primary action for task
i means for task j is also likely to understand the implications for any other task k ∈ T (j).
We explore the implications of task-to-person communication in Section VI and show that it
introduces a mechanical complementarity between task-bundling and communication quality.
In particular, the communication costs between two unbundled tasks i and j are then increasing
in the degree of specialization. In contrast, in our model with task-to-task communication, the
complementarity between p and t is uniquely due to the endogenous demand for coordination.
Finally we assume that an agent never knows whether his communication with other
9agents was successful or not. Thus, when deciding upon a primary action aii, he takes into
account that with a probability p, t h ee m p l o y e ei nc h a r g eo faji will be inﬂuenced by his
communication on aii. This greatly simpliﬁes both the analysis and exposition, and it does not
aﬀect any of our results qualitatively.




as the vector consisting of the primary action of task i,
aii, and the string of actions belonging to task j 6= i which are complementary to this primary
action aii. The organization’s proﬁts are then given by


















+( n − t)δg(p)+h(t,α) (3)
represents the production costs related to the primary action of task i.
As noted above, the eﬀectiveness of the primary action aii depends on how close it
is set to the local local circumstances θi, capturing the need for adaptation of task i to the
organizational environment. The eﬀectiveness of the complementary actions aji,j6= i, depends
on how close they are set to the choice of aii, capturing the need for coordination between the
primary action of task i and the other tasks. The parameters φ and β determine the importance
of adaptation and coordination respectively.
The labor costs of task i, denoted by h(t,α), are increasing in the level of task-bundling
t. Finally, (n − t)δg(p) represents the cost of building and maintaining the quality of the
communication channels which inform the (n − t) tasks which are not carried out by the
employee in charge of task i about the latter’s primary action.
II.E Timing
The timing of our model goes as follows:
(i) Organizational design stage: The organization determines the number of task per
agent, t and the quality of the communication channels, p.
(ii) The local circumstances θi,i=1 ,2,..,n,are realized and observed by the employee
in charge of task i.
(iii) Communication stage: Workers communicate their intended choice of primary ac-
tions to each other. With an independent probability p, these communications are successful.
10(iv) Action stage: For all i =1 ,2,..,n,t h ee m p l o y e ei nc h a r g eo ft a s ki chooses actions
aij,j=1 ,2,...,n, in such a way as to maximize the objective function (2), subject to his
information constraints.
III. ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIONS AND PERFORMANCE
Production requires the combination of n tasks; each of these involves the choice of a
primary action that needs to be adapted to the local circumstances, and n−1 complementary
actions which must be coordinated with the n − 1 primary actions of other tasks. We start
by characterizing the choice of these actions as a function of a particular organizational design
(p,t) in Lemma 1 and then evaluate the costs associated with that particular organizational
design in Lemma 2.




, choose the following primary and complementary actions:















aii when task j learns aii
b θ
i
when task j does not learn aii , (6)
Expression (4), which gives the choice of the primary action, has two terms. The ﬁrst
one is the expected value of the local circumstances. The second term captures the need for








as the equilibrium level of discretion exercised by employees. Thus, σ2(aii) characterizes how
strictly employees adhere to an ex ante plan of action or, in contrast, tailor their actions to
local circumstances.
Employee discretion is increasing in the importance of local adaptation, φ, the variability
of the local circumstances, σ2
θ, and is decreasing in the term B = β(n − t)(1− p), which
measures the limits to discretion and adaptation that result from the need to maintain some
coordination with other tasks.
11As one might expect, B is decreasing in t, the number of tasks per agent: a reduction in
specialization results in primary actions that are more adaptive to the local information as now
the worker can rely on a perfect coordination with the additional tasks under his control. Also,
B is decreasing in p : Increasing the quality of the communication channels naturally improves
coordination as now complementary actions are based on better information. This results in
more adaptive primary actions because the employees can feel conﬁdent that these actions are
more likely to be understood by other agents in the organization. Finally, B is increasing in
β, which captures the overall importance of maintaining coordination in the organization.
Substituting (4) and (6) in the proﬁt function (2) and taking expectations over θi,i=
1,2,..,n,yields the expected proﬁts as a function of a particular organizational form (p,t). The
next lemma provides a tractable expression for this expected proﬁt function, which is key in
the characterization of organizational design.

















θ − n(n − t)δg(p) − nh(t,α) (8)
IV. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN
IV.A The Economics of Coordination
Increasing returns to ex post coordination. — Organizations can coordinate their ac-
tivities ex ante by letting employees tightly stick to some pre-agreed course of action. Alter-
natively, employees may be given substantial discretion to adapt their tasks to local circum-
stances, in which case broad job deﬁnitions (task bundling) and horizontal communication
between employees must ensure that tasks are well coordinated. We refer to the latter as ex
post coordination.
In contrast to ex ante coordination, a better ex post coordination increases expected
proﬁts both through a better coordination of actions and by increasing the adaptation to local
circumstances. In the expression for expected proﬁts, (8), the beneﬁts of a better ex post
coordination come in the form of a lower B = β(n − t)(1 − p). An important implication of
(8) is that the worse actions are coordinated ex post, the lower are the incentives to locally
improve ex post coordination by either increasing task bundling (t) or improving horizontal
communication (p). Indeed, the ﬁrst term of (8), which reﬂects how well the organization is









θ is decreasing in B = β(n − t)(1 − p)
Intuitively, as ex post coordination improves (B decreases), it is optimal for the organization to
become more adaptive and increase employee discretion. Conversely, any increase in employee
discretion increases the demand for a better ex post coordination. It follows that any increase
in t or p, through its impact on employee discretion and the demand for coordination, makes
it even more desirable to further increase either task-bundling or the quality of the horizontal
communication.
A direct consequence of the above increasing returns to ex post coordination is that unless
there are also increasing costs to ex post coordination, organizations will either be extremely
rigid and fully rely on ex ante coordination, or they will exhibit substantial employee discretion
and rely on extensive ex post coordination (task-bundling and/or intensive communication).
Even a very small change in an exogenous parameter, say φ, may then result in dramatic and
discrete organizational change. We only expect to see intermediate values of task-bundling or
horizontal communication if either htt >> 0 for some values of t or gpp >> 0 for some values
of p. The next example shows a simple economy where a small change in the importance of
adaptation results in a large swing in organizational design.







with α0 = α1 =
1
4
and η =1 .5.
In addition, let n =1 2 ,δ=1 .85,β=1 , and σ2
θ =2 . Notice that −h(t,α) is concave
in t, that is, it is increasingly costly to bundle tasks, and that complete bundling is
prohibitively costly. Still, as mentioned above, there are increasing returns to ex-post
coordination, and this induces enough convexity in the proﬁt function so as to yield
extreme organizational forms as a function of φ. Indeed a simple numerical computation




6f o rφ ≥ 3.72
Hence, small changes in φ can result in big changes in organizational design. ¤
Complementarities in organizational design. — In many organizational problems, it
is often prohibitively costly to achieve complete task bundling or perfect horizontal commu-
nication. As we will argue next, if there is an interior solution for p∗ and t∗, high-quality
13communication and substantial task-bundling are complementary instruments of ex post coor-
dination. Hence, we will see more task bundling if the organization can simultaneously improve
communication between unbundled tasks. Similarly, the choice variables p and t will move up
or down together in response to changes in exogenous parameters, yielding a number of robust
comparative static predictions. For example, if the returns to specialization decrease due to
information technology or the availability of a higher skilled work-force, then this will result
in an increase in both p and t.
The intuition for this result rests again on the increasing returns to ex post coordination
that characterize organizational design. In particular, any change in one organizational design
variable, p or t, towards a better ex post coordination, increases the returns to also improve
coordination using the other organizational design variable.
Consider ﬁrst, an increase in task-bundling. The lower the level of specialization, the
better tasks are coordinated ex post and, hence, the higher will be the equilibrium level of em-
ployee discretion and adaptation. This, in turn, increases the overall demand for coordination,
making it optimal to also improve the quality of communication between unbundled tasks.
The impact of a better quality of horizontal communication on the incentives for task-
bundling is more intricate. To build intuition, it is instructive to neglect integer constraints
on task-bundling and examine the cross-partial of p and t, which is given by10
∂2Π(p,t)
∂t∂p



















The ﬁrst two terms in (9) indicate how an increase in the quality of a communication
channel aﬀects the incentives to substitute this communication channels through task-bundling.
On the one hand, the higher the quality of communication, the lower are the incentives to
make communication “perfect” by bundling tasks (second term). Improving communication
quality is costly, however. Agents, for example, may be forced to spend half of their time in
meetings. Hence, for a given communication technology, the higher the quality of communi-
cation, the more the organization saves on communication costs by bundling two tasks (ﬁrst
term). While the former eﬀect may dominate if p is very small, these two eﬀect exactly cancel
out in equilibrium. Indeed, as shown in (10),t h eﬁrst order condition with respect to p is
proportional to the ﬁrst two terms.
10This shortcut is simply to build intuition using standard calculus tools. The Appendix contains a complete
treatment where t ∈ J.
14In equilibrium, only the last term in (9) matters then. This term indicates how an
increase in the quality of the communication channel between two particular tasks aﬀects
the incentives to bundle these tasks with other unbundled tasks. Here, the logic of increasing
returns to coordination kicks in again. As two tasks become better coordinated due to improved
communication, it is optimal to allow employees more discretion in carrying out these tasks.
This, in turn, increases the demand for coordination and the incentives to bundle these tasks
with other tasks.
We now formalize the comparative static implications of the complementarity commu-
nication quality and task-bundling. To focus on interior solutions, we make the following
assumption which guarantees that there is always such a unique (interior) solution for the
quality of communication:
A1 The expected proﬁt function Π(p,t) is strictly quasi-concave in p.11
Proposition 3 Given assumption A1:
(i) The equilibrium values of the organizational design variables p and t and the equilib-
rium level of employee discretion σ2(aii) are monotone non-decreasing in the parameters
σ2
θ and φ, and monotone non-increasing in the parameter α.
(ii) p∗ is strictly increasing in t∗ following any change in σ2
θ,φor α.
(iii) There exists an ε>0 such that whenever
¯ ¯β − β0¯ ¯ <ε ,then t∗(β) >t ∗(β0) ⇒
p∗(β) >p ∗(β0)
Thus, our model predicts that if adaptation to local circumstances becomes more im-
portant or the variability of this local environment increases, this will result in more employee
discretion, broader job deﬁnitions, and better horizontal communication. Similarly, a decrease
in the returns to specialization results, trivially, in broader job descriptions, but also more
intensive horizontal communication, and increased employee discretion. Moreover, because of
the complementarity between these organizational design variables, each change in one of them
will reinforce further changes in the others. In contrast, and as we discuss further below, the
comparative statics with respect to the importance of task interdependence, as measured by
β, are ambiguous, but task-bundling and communication quality always move up and down
together in equilibrium.
11Obviously, this condition will always be veriﬁed whenever the expect proﬁt functions is strictly concave. A
(very) suﬃcient condition for strict concavity is that 2β
2σ
2
θ <φ δ g pp (p), which will always be veriﬁed whenever
φ is large enough, or β is small enough.
15The next example illustrates the impact of the complementarity between task bundling
and the equilibrium level of horizontal communication on organizational design.




with α =1 .
T h er e s to ft h ep a r a m e t e r s ,a sw e l la sg (p), are as in Example 1. Figure I shows, the op-
timal task bundling in two cases. The line labeled “p endogenous” shows t∗ as a function
of φ when the quality of communication, p, is optimally chosen. The line labeled “p ex-
ogenous” denotes t∗ when instead the quality of horizontal communication is exogenously
set to be equal to p∗ (t =1 ,φ=2 ), and hence task bundling is the only organizational
design variable.
As illustrated in Figure I, because of the complementarity between t and p, the returns
to increasing task-bundling are much larger if the organization can simultaneously im-
prove communication between unbundled tasks. Similarly, we see intermediate values of
specialization for a much smaller range of φsi fp is endogenous. The reason is that if p
is exogenous, the increasing returns to task-bundling are much smaller as improvements
in ex post coordination are much more limited. ¤
One may wonder whether Proposition 3 stems from Π(p,t) being supermodular in its
arguments, p and t, and the exogenous parameters σ2
θ,φand −α. Roughly speaking, a function
is supermodular if the returns to increasing one of the arguments are higher the higher the
other arguments. Supermodularity then formalizes the idea of ‘complementarity’ or ‘ﬁt’ among
choice variables and allows for unambiguous comparative statics.12
However, Π(p,t) is not supermodular on the full support of its variables. As argued
above, if the quality of communication is (ineﬃciently) low, broader task assignments often
become more attractive as communication deteriorates: p and t are typically substitutes for
p< <p ∗. The complementarity between p and t only holds for equilibrium levels of communi-
cation. Therefore, in order to prove Proposition 3, the appendix considers the optimized value
of proﬁts with respect to p,w h e r ep is restricted by a lower bound b p,
π (b p,t)=m a x
p≥b p
Π(p,t),
12In particular, if a function of a vector of choice variables y =( y
1,...,y
k) a n da ne x o g e n o u sp a r a m e t e rτ is
supermodular, then the maximizers y
∗(τ) will be monotone nondecreasing in the parameter τ. For an excellent
discussion of supermodularity, see Milgrom and Roberts (1990).






this change of variables leaves the optimal value of t unchanged. Moreover, if for any ﬁxed
values of the other variables, p∗ is unique, the highest optimal value of b p equals p∗.
IV.B. The Tenuous Trade-oﬀ between Coordination and Specialization
We now consider the impact of two parameters which directly aﬀect the trade-oﬀ be-
tween specialization and coordination: β, which characterizes the task interdependence or the
importance of coordination and δ, which characterizes the cost of improving the communica-
tion technology. We show that whereas the elasticity of the demand for coordination resulted
in monotone comparative statics with respect to φ (importance of adaptation), σ2
θ (variance of
local circumstances) and α (returns to specialization), this same elasticity of the demand for
coordination implies that the impact of β and δ on task specialization is decidedly ambiguous.
Task Interdependence.— Adam Smith’s famous observation that the “the division of labor
is limited by the extent of the market,” has been challenged by both the management literature
as well as economists such as Becker and Murphy (1992). These two strands of the literature
have emphasized that perhaps, more importantly, specialization is mainly constrained by the
need to coordinate activities. In particular, a straightforward comparative static prediction in
Becker and Murphy (1992) is that as coordination costs increase, one should see less special-
ization. Taking into account the endogeneity of the demand for coordination, however, yields
a much more subtle picture.
An increase in the importance of coordination aﬀects two margins: First, for a given
level of employee discretion, it will become more important to improve ex post coordination by
increasing task bundling and improving horizontal communication. This is the eﬀect empha-
sized in the literature. Second, and as important,i tw i l lb e c o m eo p t i m a lt oc o n s t r a i ne m p l o y e e
discretion, reducing the demand for ex post coordination. Because of the elasticity of the
demand for coordination, task specialization may therefore increase as coordination becomes
more important.
In particular, if the demand for coordination is suﬃciently elastic, the impact of task
interdependence on task specialization is non-monotonic.O b v i o u s l y ,i fβ is small and tasks are
virtually independent, task coordination can be neglected and it is optimal to have full task
specialization (t∗ =1 )and extreme employee discretion. As β increases, it will initially be
optimal to reduce specialization (t∗ > 1) and have broader tasks in order to better coordinate
these discretionary actions. As β increases further, however, employee discretion becomes
more and more limited and eventually it will become optimal to reduce task bundling and
17horizontal communication. Intuitively, if β is large, then the decrease in employee discretion
resulting from a further increase in β outweighs the need to better coordinate whatever is left
of employee discretion. The organization then increasingly relies on ex ante coordination as
opposed to ex post coordination. In the limit, as coordination becomes very important, the
organization reverts again to complete specialization (t∗ =1 )and fully coordinates activities
ex ante by restricting employee discretion. The next example illustrates this logic.
Example 3. Consider Example 2 again, but now rather than exploring the comparative
statics with respect to φ we do so with respect to β. Figure II illustrates the equilibrium
task specialization and communication quality (Panel A), and the equilibrium level of
employee discretion (Panel B) as a function of β,w h e nφ =3 . As argued above, once em-
ployee discretion is suﬃciently limited, any further increase in coordination costs results
in more specialization. Note also that p∗ and t∗ move up and down together in response
to changes in β, as predicted by Proposition 3, (iii). ¤














which is positive if and only if φ>B .In other words, ﬁxing φ, if task coordination becomes
more important, this increases local incentives towards more specialization if and only if em-
ployee discretion, given by (φ/(φ + B))
2 σ2
θ, is suﬃciently limited.
Since the non-monotonicity stems from the elasticity of the demand for coordination,
it will only occur if φ is not too large. Indeed, if adaptation to local circumstances is very
important, employee discretion will vary little with task interdependence and the demand for
coordination is rather inelastic. We formalize the above intuitions as follows. Deﬁne ˆ t as the
optimal level of task-bundling if the organizations wants to achieve perfect communication
between diﬀerent tasks
ˆ t ≡ argmin
t
{n(n − t)δg(1) + h(t,α)}.
Then the following result holds.
Proposition 4. (a) Given α, there exists a unique φ such that
lim
β−→∞
t∗ = ˆ t if φ>φ
lim
β−→∞
t∗ =1 if φ<φ,
where t∗ is the optimal number of tasks per job, and (b) φ is increasing in α.
18The following corollary is then immediate and given without proof.
Corollary 5. If φ<φ, then the level of task specialization is non-monotonic in the degree of
task-interdependence (β).
Communication costs. — Perhaps the most natural way to coordinate specialized activities
is through communication. Indeed, agents spend a substantial amount of their time commu-
nicating with each other in the workplace and meetings, conference calls, and writing and
reading electronic mail dominate the modern professional environment. An important ques-
tion therefore is how improvements in communication technology or diﬀerences in the ease of
communication aﬀect the specialization of agents. For instance, if due to logistical or episte-
mological reasons, the transmission of information is easier in certain economic processes or
activities, do we expect to see more or less specialization?
Bolton and Dewatripont (1992) and Garicano (2000), among others, have addressed this
issue in diﬀerent settings.13 These authors identify an important trade-oﬀ between special-
ization and communication cost, namely, that one should expect to see more specialization as
communication costs decrease and coordination becomes easier. But, as before, taking into
account the endogeneity of the demand for coordination yields a much more subtle picture.
I nv e r ym u c ht h es a m ew a ya sac h a n g ei nβ, a decrease in the cost of (improving)
communication, as characterized by the parameter δ, aﬀects two margins. First, for a given
level of employee discretion and adaptation, it will be easier to coordinate specialized activities,
reducing the need for task-bundling. This is the eﬀect emphasized by Bolton and Dewatripont
(1992) and Garicano (2000). Second, as communication improves it will become optimal to
become more adaptive and increase employee discretion, which favors more task bundling in
order to reduce coordination failures. Because of the elasticity of the demand for coordination,
task specialization may therefore decrease as communication costs decrease or communication
technology improves.
Consider, for example, a case in which communication is very poor or costly (δ is very
large), and complete task bundling is not feasible. Organization then often forego the beneﬁts
of being adaptive, but instead choose to limit the discretion of employees and reap the beneﬁts
of extreme task specialization. In the latter case, lower communication costs will typically be
complementary to broader task assignments. In particular, improvements in communication
13Bolton and Dewatripont (1992) consider the returns to division of labor in information processing. Garicano
(2000) considers vertical specialization in knowledge acquisition, where some agents may specialize in solving
more diﬃcult problems.
19technology may transform this very rigid and specialized organization into a ﬂexible orga-
nizations characterized by substantial employee discretion and broad task assignments and
intensive horizontal communication. As communication technology further improves, however,
the beneﬁts of task bundling in terms of reduced coordination failures or lower communication
costs become smaller and smaller. Task bundling and improvements in communication tech-
nology become then substitutes and task specialization increases again. The following example
illustrates the non-monotonicity of organizational design with respect to δ.
Example 4. Consider again Example 1, but now the comparative statics are with respect to
δ (cost of communication) rather than φ, so we set φ =3 . Figure III plots p∗ as a function
of δ .T h eﬁgure also denotes the degree of task bundling, t∗, as a function of δ. Reading
the ﬁgure from right to left, as δ falls below 1.365, the organization is transformed from a
very rigid and specialized organization to an organization with substantial task-bundling,
intensive horizontal communication and almost unlimited employee discretion. This il-
lustrates how for large communication costs, improvements in communication technology
and task-bundling are complements. Note that even when communication becomes per-
fect (p∗ =1 ) , there is still a role for task-bundling in reducing communication costs. Only
when the communication cost parameter δ falls below 0.59, communication has become
suﬃciently cheap to warrant full specialization. In this example, task-bundling and im-
provements in communication technology are thus only substitutes when communication
costs are small. ¤
The following proposition gives suﬃcient conditions under which the impact of a better
communication technology has a non-monotonic impact on task specialization. Since the non-
monotonicity stems from the elastic demand for coordination, it will only be observed if φ is
not too large.
Proposition 6. Given α there exists a unique φ such that
lim
δ−→∞
t∗ =l i m
δ−→0
t∗ =1 i fa n do n l yi f φ<φ
where φ is increasing in α.
Then, as before, the following corollary follows immediately and is given without proof.
Corollary 7. For φ<φ, the level of task specialization is non-monotonic in the cost of
communication δ.
20V. EXTENSIONS
V.A The Role of Management
“The key role of management in organizations is to ensure coordination.”
Milgrom and Roberts (1992), Chapter 4.
A key insight in the previous analysis was that organizations can rely either on ex ante
coordination, where specialized employees stick tightly to some pre-agreed task rules, or ex
post coordination, where broadly deﬁned job deﬁnitions and intensive horizontal communica-
tion coordinate discretionary actions. Obviously, the role of management in organizations is
complex and varied but coordination, as emphasized by Milgrom and Roberts (1992), is a
central aspect of this role. In particular, in this section, we posit that the role of management
lies in improving ex ante coordination: management updates and improves the quality of the
task rules to which employees stick in the absence of horizontal communication.
A direct consequence of this role is that a large management and extensive vertical co-
ordination will be complementary to specialized jobs and limited horizontal communication.
In contrast, a small management will be complementary to broadly deﬁned jobs and intensive
horizontal communication. To put it diﬀerently, an organization can adapt while remaining
coordinated by increasing employee discretion and having broadly deﬁned jobs. Alternatively,
the organization can remain adaptive and coordinated by having its managerial force intervene
frequently in order to keep up-to-date the task guidelines which very specialized agents use
to coordinate their activities. Both ‘types’ of organizational design aim at achieving adapta-
tion through a set of very diﬀerent but complementary and mutually reinforcing elements of
organizational design.
V.A.1 What do managers do?
In the absence of informative communication, agents behave as if the co-worker in charge
of task i has chosen a primary action aii equal to average state of nature b θ
i
.K n o w l e d g e o f
b θ
i
, the rule that agents follow in the case of faulty communication, is thus key to guarantee
eﬃcient coordination in the workplace. But, where do these rules come from? In this section,
we propose a simple dynamic version of our model in which the role of management is exactly
that: introducing and improving these rules.14
14Organizational instructions include the training which employees receive, routines and procedures developed
by management, task manuals, etc.
21Formally, we consider a two period model, in which in period 2,θ i is drawn from a
distribution with mean ˆ θ
i
+ εi, where εi is an i.i.d shock, normally distributed with mean
E(εi)=0and variance σ2
ε, which occurs after period 1.15 Thus, the unconditional variance
of θi in the second period equals σ2
θ + σ2
ε. A sb e f o r e ,o n l yt h ee m p l o y e ei nc h a r g eo ft a s k
i can observe θi. Management, in contrast cannot but it does observe εi and hence it has a







. Management then may choose to intervene in period 1 to improve the rules
workers will follow in the absence of information.
For simplicity, we assume that when instructions for a particular primary action are
improved upon, they are also improved for the actions complementary to this primary action. If
no new instructions are issued, the old instructions remain in place. Naturally, communicating
and explaining new guidelines to employees is costly. Let
I(m) with Im < 0
be the cost of changing the rules for a vector of actions ai, where m is the size of management in
the organization, an endogenous variable.16 Thus, I(m) measures the ability of the organization
to react to aggregate events in a centralized way and the larger the number of managers in the
organization the lower the costs of implementing change.17
V.A.2 Management intervention
Organizational design will take place taking into account the possibility of management
intervention to improve coordination and organizational adaptability. Lemma 7 shows that,
quite naturally, management will implement change whenever the shock εi is suﬃciently large.





















>b(t) for t,t ∈ J and t < t.
15The assumption on the normality of ε
i is made to simplify the proofs of the propositions and it is much
stronger than needed.
16In contrast to horizontal communication, the outcome of vertical communication is thus deterministic, which
simpliﬁes the analysis. It is easy to see, however, that as long as the probability of success is correlated, our
results would not be aﬀected if the outcome was probabilistic.
17For simplicity, and without any loss of generality we take m ∈ R+.
22First, trivially, intervention by management is less likely the lower the size of its force, m,
as the cost of intervention I (m) is decreasing in it. Second, intervention by management is less
likely the larger the quality of the horizontal communication and the more tasks are bundled.
If p is high, then management can rely on the communication across tasks to implement the
necessary coordination, which makes the introduction of a new organizational rule b θ
i
+ εi less
useful. Similarly, the higher the number of tasks per job, the more adaptive the organization
will be and hence the less useful adaptation is via management intervention.
As in Section III knowledge of the expected proﬁt function is needed in order to char-
acterize organizational design. Let P be the probability that management intervenes in a
particular task, that is
P = prob
£ ¯ ¯εi¯ ¯ >b
¤
.
The following lemma provides the expected proﬁt function in the second period, that of the
ﬁrst period being identical to the one reported in Lemma 2. For analytical purposes, we will
consider b as an organizational design variable, chosen at the organizational design stage. In
equilibrium, however, b will always satisfy equation (11).
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The term (12) represents the expected second period cost in the absence of any coordina-
tion by management. It is identical to the organizational cost expression in Lemma 2, except
that the variance of θi now equals σ2
θ + σ2
ε. Expression (13) represents the impact of manage-
ment on the organization’s proﬁt function. First, the presence of management involves a ﬁxed
cost ωm, where ω stands for the manager’s wage per task. Second, whenever management
intervenes to update b θ
i
, which occurs with probability P, the organization suﬀers a variable






is as if the second period variance of θi is only σ2
θ as opposed to σ2
θ + σ2
ε.
23V.A.3 Management and Organizational Design
We are now ready to characterize the relationship between the size of management, the
frequency of managerial intervention, and the other organizational design variables. As before,







and with some abuse of notation we denote it Π(p,t,b,−m,τ). As in
Section III we focus on the case of interior solutions, and make a similar assumption in terms
of the strict quasiconcavity of the proﬁt function.
A2 The proﬁt function Π(p,t,b,−m,τ) is strictly quasi-concave in p.
Finally, for the same reasons as above, the complementarity between p and t only holds
for equilibrium levels of communication. Hence we restrict our analysis to the function,
π(b p,t,b,−m,τ)=m a x
p≥b p
Π(p,t,b,−m,τ),
rather than to Π(p,t,b,−m,τ). Then we can prove the following
Proposition 10. (i) The expected proﬁt functions





are supermodular on R+ ×J×R3
+.
(ii) The equilibrium values of the organizational design variables p,t,b and −m are
monotone non-decreasing in the parameters σ2
θ and ω, and monotone non-increasing
in α.
In a nutshell, the size of management, the extent of ex-ante coordination in the organi-
zation, is a substitute for the equilibrium level of employee discretion, or the extent of ex-post
coordination. To put it diﬀerently, the returns to increasing the size of management (m) and
the frequency of managerial intervention (as measured by b) are increasing in the level of task
specialization and decreasing in the quality of the horizontal communication network. Propo-
sition 9 coincides with the casual observation that organizations with extensive management
forces are associated with the intense specialization of the workers’ narrow job descriptions.18
18Some empirical evidence on the dissapperance of middle management has been recently reported in Ra-
jan and Wulf (2002). Consistent with our complementarity result, this ‘ﬂattening of the hierarchy’ occured
simultaneously with changes in workplace organization towards broader job deﬁnitions and team work.
24The most interesting comparative static results of Proposition 9 are those with respect to
task uncertainty. In particular, an increase in the local uncertainty σ2
θ is met by organizations
with a reduction in the size of the managerial force, m, and a decrease in the frequency of
vertical coordination, that is, an increase in the intervention bound b. The reason is that an
increase in local uncertainty makes it optimal to increase task bundling, which decreases the
returns to vertical coordination. In contrast, an increase in the overall uncertainty which is
not related to local uncertainty, σ2
ε, has ambiguous implications. Indeed, the direct eﬀect of an
increase in σ2
ε will be both to increase management and task bundling to improve adaptation.
More task-bundling and a larger management, however, are substitutes: increasing one lowers
the returns of increasing the other. Therefore, an increase in σ2
ε may result in a decrease in
the size of the managerial force, m.19
V.B Endogenous Ability to Adapt and Investments in Skills and IT
In our basic model, adaptation is uniquely constrained by the organization’s ability to
coordinate. In many circumstances, though, adaptation to local conditions may require speciﬁc
knowledge, skills or supporting tools. In particular, a number of studies (Autor, Levy, and
Murname (2003) and Maurin and Thesmar (forthcoming)) have argued that the demand for
high-skilled labor is a demand for employees which possess superior cognitive or information-
processing abilities. In terms of our model, the cognitive abilities of higher skilled workers
may allow the latter to better observe local conditions or they may better know how to adapt
to these local conditions. Similarly, organizations may improve the ability of its employees
to adapt by investing in Information Technology (IT), such as expert systems and database
technology or by providing more training.
To formalize the notion of an endogenous ability to adapt, we assume that an agent
in charge of task i observes θi with probability q(t,x), whereas with probability 1 − q(t,x),
he observes pure noise. The variable x denotes these investments in skills and IT, where we
assume that qx(t,x) > 0 and qxx(t,x) < 0. We denote by C(x,λ) the related costs to the
organization with Cx(0) = 0,C x > 0 and Cxx > 0. The parameter λ could, for example, reﬂect
the cost of IT equipment in which case it is naturally to assume that Cxλ(x,λ) > 0.
So far, we have modeled the returns of specialization uniquely in terms of reduced labor
costs to complete a particular task. Task specialization, however, may not only reduce the
labor cost of performing a task, it may also improve the quality of task execution itself. In
particular, for a given skill and IT stock, an increase in task-specialization may potentially
19This could occur, for example, if I(m) becomes very convex for larger values of m.






≤ q(t,x) for t,t ∈ J with t>t ,
or, ignoring integer constraints, qt ≤ 0. Finally, it is natural to assume that investments in
skills and IT are at least weakly more productive in those case where extensive task-bundling
has decreased the employees ability to adapt. Neglecting integer constraints, this is equivalent
to assuming that qxt(t,x) ≥ 0. The management literature, for example, has argued that
improvements and investments in IT have made the informational returns to specialization, as
expressed by −qt, much less relevant than they used to be.20














when θi observed (probability q(t,x))
b θ
i
when θi not observed (probability 1 − q(t,x))
,
and the complementary actions are as in Lemma 1. The expected proﬁt associated with









θ − δn(n − t)g (p) − nh(t,α) − C(x,λ). (14)




φ + β(1 − p)(1 − t)
¶
σ2
θ = Cx(x∗,λ) (15)
It follows that equilibrium investments in skills and IT are strictly increasing in both p and
t, even when qxt(t,x)=0 . Intuitively, the larger are p and t, the better the organization
can coordinate discretionary behavior, and hence, the more worthwhile it is to invest in skills
and IT which allow employees to better observe or adapt to local circumstances. Conversely,
the higher the skill-level of employees or the stock of ﬂexibility enhancing IT, the larger are
the payoﬀs to improve ex-post coordination. In other words, x is complementary with t and
p. If one neglects any direct impact of task specialization on the ability to adapt, that is
q(t,x) ≡ q(x), this yields the following comparative static implications:
20Hammer and Champy (2001), for example, recount how the development of a sophisticated computer system
designed to support deal structures, allowed IBM Credit to replace several specialists - credit checkers, pricers,
and so on - with one generalist. All tasks fell well within the capability of a single individual when supported
by a computer system providing access to the data and tools the specialists would use.
26A3 The expected proﬁt function Π(p,t,x) is strictly quasi-concave in p.
Proposition 11 Assume q(t,x) ≡ q(x) and A3, then
(i) The equilibrium values of the organizational design variables x,p and t are monotone
increasing in σ2
θ and φ, and monotone decreasing in α and the parameter λ, which char-
acterizes the cost of information technology equipment
(ii) The equilibrium ability to observe or adapt to local circumstances, q(x∗), is strictly
increasing in t∗ following any change in σ2
θ,φ,αor λ.
From Proposition 11, if the returns to specialization come uniquely in terms of reduced
labor costs, then the complementarity between task-bundling and investments in skills and IT
implies that an increase in task-bundling indirectly increases the ability of employees to adapt.
As argued above, however, task specialization may also improve the quality of task execution
by improving the ability of an employee to observe or adapt to local circumstances. The total
impact of an increase in t on the ability to adapt is then given by
q(¯ t,x∗(¯ t)) − q(t,x ∗(t))
| {z }
= q(¯ t,x∗(¯ t)) − q(t,x ∗(¯ t))
| {z }
+ q(t,x ∗(¯ t)) − q(t,x ∗(t))
| {z }
+ or −− +
and is ambiguous. Put diﬀerently, an increase in task-bundling may translate itself mainly in
more investments in skills and IT, in which case the ability to adapt is left intact or improved.
In contrast, if investment in IT and skills are not very productive, task-bundling will likely be
associated with a lower equilibrium ability to adapt.
In the remainder of this section, we neglect any investments in skills or IT, in which case
more task-bundling unambiguously reduces the ability of employees to adapt. Nevertheless, we
show that as long as the impact of task-bundling on q(t,x) is not too negative, our qualitative
results remain valid. In particular, what is needed is that the equilibrium level of employee
discretion is increasing in the amount of task-bundling. Assume therefore that x is exogenously
ﬁxed, that is q(t,x) ≡ q(t). Then the equilibrium level of employee discretion, as characterized












27It follows that if the assumption A1 above is met, that is, if the proﬁt function (14) is strictly
quasiconcave in p, then the equilibrium value of p will be increasing in t whenever an increase








φ + β(1 − p)(n − t)
. (16)
From (16), more task-bundling results in more employee discretion and better communication
whenever (i) the informational returns to specialization, as characterized by −qt/q (t), are not
too large and (ii) the equilibrium level of communication quality, p, is not too high. Intuitively,
if p is very large, the factor limiting adaptability is the quality of the information observed
by workers, rather than the inability to coordinate. By increasing the degree of specialization
the organization will be able to generate better information on the local conditions, with little
eﬀect on the organization’s ability to coordinate as p is very large. It follows then that for a
high levels of p, communication and task bundling are substitutes rather than complements.
Condition (16) guarantees robust comparative statics with respect to the ‘traditional’
returns to specialization α. Condition (16) is also suﬃcient to guarantee increasing returns
to ex-post coordination and the ensuing convexity of the proﬁt-function in t. In order to
obtain robust comparative statics with respect to task-uncertainty, however, a slightly more
stringent condition is necessary. As in our basic model, an increase in the variance of local
information pushes the organizations to become more adaptive to this local information. Now,
however, the organization could potentially become more adaptive by increasing specialization
and, hence, improving the observation of local conditions. Concretely, keeping p ﬁxed and
neglecting integer constraints, an increase in σ2






φ + β(1 − p)(n − t)
, (17)
the interpretation of which is similar to that of condition (16). The following example illustrates
the above ﬁndings:
Example 5. Assume that
q(t)=e−ρ(t−1) with ρ>0.
such that the parameter ρ equals −qt/q (t) and characterizes the returns to specialization.
Only if agents are fully specialized they observe the signal perfectly. Under A1,as u ﬃcient
condition for (16) and (17) to hold for the equilibrium values of p∗ and t∗ is then that










For the set of economies for which (16) and (17) hold given (p,t)=( p1,1), unambiguous
comparative statics with respect to α, ρ and σ2
θ obtain, the weaker condition (17) being
suﬃcient for α and ρ. In particular, it is straightforward to show that the equilibrium
values of p and t and the employee discretion σ2(aii) a r et h e nw e a k l yi n c r e a s i n gi nσ2
θ and
weakly decreasing in the traditional and the informational returns to specialization, α
and ρ, respectively. In addition, p∗ is strictly increasing in t∗ following any change in σ2
θ,
α or ρ. As noted, it is natural to assume that improvements in information technology
are associated with a decrease in ρ = −qt/q (t). ¤
To summarize, if the ability to adapt to local circumstances is both increasing in the
specialization of employees and in investments in skills and IT, the total impact of an increase
in task-bundling on the ability to adapt to local circumstances is ambiguous. More task-
bundling will then most likely result in more employee discretion, in which case our qualitative
results are not aﬀected.
V.C The Nature of Communication
In our model, we have assumed that communication occurs task-to-task:E v e ni ft a s kj
and task k are allocated to the same agent, if the latter understands the implications of aii for
task j, this does not imply that he understands what it means for task k. Given a level of task
bundling t, each task then requires (n − t) communications, from which the total cost of the
organization’s communication network equals n(n − t)δg(p).
As mentioned above, task-to-task communication is a natural assumption when the way
a particular task is carried out cannot be easily summarized and aﬀects diﬀerent tasks dif-
ferently. In addition task-to-task communication has the theoretically appealing feature that
communication costs between two unbundled task i and j are independent of the degree of spe-
cialization. Thus, modeling communication task-to-task does not introduce any organizational
design bias.
An alternative assumption about the nature of communication occurs when tasks are
suﬃciently simple such that they can be comprehensively described in a nut-shell. An employee
21Indeed, the RHS of the inequality (16) is increasing in t if p is ﬁxed. Moreover, the optimized value of p
given t, p
∗(t), is increasing in t only if the inequality holds strictly. Since from A1,p
∗(t) is continuous in t, it
follows that if the inequality holds for (p,t)=( p1,1), then it will hold for any (p(t),t) with t>1.
29which understands the implication of the choice of the primary action of task i for task j is then
also likely to understand the implications for any other task k 6= j allocated to him. We refer
to this as task-to-person communication. As already mentioned in Section II though, task-to-
person communication introduces a mechanical complementarity betweent and p. The reason is
that a higher level of task-bundling then increases the returns to improve the communication
quality p for purely technological reasons: the associated communication cost can be split
among more tasks.
Indeed if communication occurs task-to-person then, given a level of task-bundling t,
each task only requires (n





















As one can notice, task-to-person communication introduces a mechanical complementarity
between task-bundling and communication quality. A higher level of task-bundling increases
the returns to improve the communication quality p for purely technological reasons: the
associated communication cost can be split among more tasks. Indeed, neglecting integer















The ﬁrst term equals zero when p = p∗, the second term represents the complementarity be-
tween p and t which stems from the increasing returns to coordination, and the last term
represents the mechanical complementarity between p and t. Obviously, this mechanical com-
plementarity will only reinforce our results on complementarity between p and t, and will not
interfere with the non-monotonic comparative static results with respect to β and δ. One can
therefore easily show that Propositions/Corollaries 3− 7 hold under task-to-person communi-
cation.
VI. EVIDENCE AND EXAMPLES
In this section we survey some of the empirical ﬁndings on organizational design and its
determinants. We start by reporting evidence concerning recent changes in workplace reorgani-
zation. Essentially, this evidence suggests that there has been a trend from one organizational
30mode to another. The ﬁrst is characterized by stark specialization and centralized decision
making whereas the second hinges on broad task assignments and increased worker responsi-
bility. As we have argued, these two modes are the natural result of the endogenous demand
for coordination. We then examine the empirical link between organizational design and the
relevant parameters in our model, such as the extent of task interdependence, environmental
uncertainty, or the information technology.
VI.A The emergence of new workplace practices
A substantial body of work documents how the organization of work inside ﬁrms experi-
enced dramatic changes in recent decades. A number of these accounts are mainly historical.
Cyert and Mowery (1987) and Boyer (1991), for example, provide an analysis of the evolution
of modern manufacturing in the US and other OECD countries, respectively. They depict how,
since the beginning of 20th century, Fordist and Tayloristic principles increasingly deﬁned the
organization of the work process. These principles resulted in a deep (and deepening) division
of labor as well as in a strong centralization of decision making, where control over the pace of
work and the structure of jobs belonged to management. In the 1980s, however, a new model of
management and work organization started to emerge, characterized by more decentralization
and a weaker division of labor. In this new organizational regime, workers tend to perform a
wider range of tasks and are allocated more responsibility.
Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) oﬀer empirical evidence on the trend towards broader
tasks assignment and increased worker responsibility, based on the British Workplace Industrial
Relations Survey (WIRS). In this survey, senior managers were asked whether organizational
change led to more or less responsibility as well as to whether it resulted in a wider range of
tasks performed. The results are contained in Table 1, which partially reproduces Table I in
Caroli and Van Reenen (2001). 46.2% and 32.8% of managers responded that organizational
change led to more responsibility in non manual and manual jobs respectively and only rarely
did it lead to a reduction of responsibility. Similarly, organizational change resulted in broader
task assignments in both non manual (62.5%) and manual jobs (39.5%).
In addition, other empirical studies have found that organizational change has led to
more worker autonomy and responsibility,22 to a stronger emphasis on team work,23 and to
a greater intensity and variety of communication channels.24 Caroli (2001) and the report by
OECD (1999) provide extensive surveys of this literature. Consistent with the predictions of
22See Freechou and Greenan (1995) and Coutrot (1996).
23See Osterman (1994), who uses a US survey on innovative work practices, and Coutrot (1996).
24See Bue (1989) and Coutrot (1996).
31our model, both studies ﬁnd substantial evidence that these new organizational practices tend
to be adopted in clusters, suggesting that they are complementary.25
VI.B The impact of Information Technology (IT)
The potential link between information technology (IT) and new workplace practices has
received much attention lately. Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1998), for example, provide substantial
evidence that IT and new work practices cluster together.26 In particular their focus is on
the impact of organizational design on the demand for IT and they ﬁnd that this is larger
for ﬁrms with substantial use of teams and broad job deﬁnitions. To brieﬂy illustrate some
of their results, Table 2, which is taken from their Table 2a, shows the correlation of various
measures of information technology with the use of teams and broader job descriptions. Notice
that the correlation is positive and signiﬁcant independently of the measure of IT used. In
addition, they also provide evidence that ﬁrms with larger investments in IT are more likely
to give their workers substantial discretion.27 The impact of IT is consistent with our model’s
predictions. First, as argued in Section VI.B, IT increases the capabilities of employees to
perform information processing tasks, which is complementary with broader job assignments
and more employee discretion. Second, IT is also likely to reduce communication costs, an
eﬀect that the previous literature has argued leads towards more specialization.28 This is in
direct contradiction with the results in Table 2 that show, for example, that there is a strongly
signiﬁcant positive correlation between the use of email and broadly deﬁned jobs. Our model
resolves this apparent contradiction by showing that by increasing employee discretion, lower
communication costs often results in more task-bundling, as shown in the data.
VI.C The impact of environmental uncertainty
New workplace practices can also result from changes in demand conditions. For instance,
using US data, Osterman (1994) ﬁnds that establishment facing an international demand tend
to use more new workplace practices, as are establishment which have adopted a ‘high road
strategy’ emphasizing product quality and customization. To the extent that these conditions
are associated with a more volatile demand and consumer needs, this is consistent with the our
comparative static predictions with respect to environmental uncertainty and the importance
of adaptation.
25Osterman (1994), Ichinowski et al. (1997), Brynjolfsson et al. (1998) and Bresnahan et al. (2002).
26See also, Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002), which provide additional evidence for this complemen-
tarity, as well as the link with demand for high-skilled labour.
27Similar results are obtained by Coutrot (1996) on French data.
28See Bolton and Dewatripont (1992) and Garicano (2000).
32A much earlier account of the link between task uncertainty and organizational design can
be found in an inﬂuential paper by Van de Ven, Delbeq, and Koenig (1976). This paper studies
the coordination and communication modes in sixteen district oﬃces as well as the headquarter
of a large employment security agency.29 They collected observations on 197 formal work units,
as oﬃcially deﬁned in the organizational chart. These units, which are formed by a supervisor
and a varying number of agents, face diﬀerent coordination and adaptation challenges. Van de
Ven et al. (1976) measured the degree of uncertainty that each unit faced30 as well as the degree
with which diﬀerent “modes” are used to achieve coordination. According to their classiﬁcation,
coordination can be achieved through the use of “impersonal coordination modes,” which
include the use of rules and procedures and that of plans and schedules, “personal coordination
modes,” which include both vertical and horizontal communication, and “group coordination
mode,” that includes both the use of scheduled and unscheduled meetings.
Table 4, which is taken from Van de Ven et al. (1976), shows the zero order correlation
among independent variables and coordination modes. The correlation between task uncer-
tainty and impersonal modes of communication, which includes rules and procedures and plans
and schedules, is strongly negative, whereas it is strongly positive with horizontal communica-
tion modes and group coordination modes, as predicted by our model. Interestingly, vertical
channels show no discernible correlation with task uncertainty.
Table 5 shows the results of a multivariate regression of the diﬀerent coordination modes
against task uncertainty, interdependence, and unit size. The results indicate that task un-
certainty decreases impersonal modes of coordination, the rules and instructions provided by
the organization, whereas it signiﬁcantly increases horizontal communication modes as well
as group coordination mechanisms. These results conﬁrm that both rules, that is, limited
employee discretion, and managerial intervention substitute horizontal communication in the
presence of signiﬁcant uncertainty.31
29The organization of employment security agencies was subject of an extensive and very detailed study in
Blau and Schoenherr (1971). Chapter 2 of their book provides an informal description of employment security
agencies, whose responsibilities include everything from placement of unemployed workers to counseling and the
distribution of unemployed beneﬁts.
30Task uncertainty was measured as the average responses to several questions relating to the variability of
tasks . For instance, a sample question for task uncertainty was “How much variety in cases, claims, clients, or
things do you generally encounter in your normal working day?”
31Another interesting study is that of Argote (1982), who investigates the relation between input uncertainty,
the means of coordination, and the criteria for organizational eﬀectiveness in a sample of emergency units in
several hospitals, which experience a considerable degree of uncertainty on a daily basis such as the overall
composition of patient needs and their appropriate treatments. She ﬁnds that high input uncertainty correlates
33VI.D The impact of task interdependence
Lincoln, Hanada, and McBride (1986), ﬁnally, oﬀer some evidence of the impact of task
interdependence on task specialization. Among other things, their study of diﬀerences in
organizational practices across US and Japanese ﬁrms ﬁnds that workers in Japanese ﬁrms
are less specialized. While cultural factors explain this partially, technological factors are
important as well. Table 2, which partially reproduces Table 3 in Lincoln et al. (1986), shows
the result of a regression of specialization on several variables, of which we report only the
signiﬁcant ones. As can be seen, interdependence increases specialization rather than decrease
it, an observation that contradicts the simple trade-oﬀ between coordination and specialization
emphasized by Becker and Murphy (1992).32 In contrast, our model shows how an increase
in task interdependence may increase task-specialization as it decreasing employee discretion
and, hence, the demand for ex post coordination.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have argued that endogenizing the demand for coordination is essential in
both understanding the problem of organizational design from a theoretical point of view as well
as in rationalizing the changes in workplace practices observed over the last two decades. The
endogeneity of the demand for coordination induces a proﬁt function for the organization that
is often convex in the degree of specialization of its members and in the quality of the horizontal
communication between them. The reason is that organizations exhibit increasing returns to
coordination, that is, the better the coordination between the members of the organization
the higher the demand for further coordination. A direct consequence of this observation is
that organizations tend to oscillate between two distinct modes. In the ﬁrst one, organizations
are characterized by very specialized job descriptions and limited employee discretion whereas
the second displays broad job classiﬁcations and substantial employee discretion. The ﬁrst,
then, coordinates ex-ante, exploiting specialization gains and sacriﬁcing adaptability whereas
the second, coordinates ex-post, foregoing the beneﬁts of specialization to gain in adaptability.
T h ec o n v e x i t yo ft h ep r o ﬁt function with respect to the degree of specialization and
the quality of the horizontal communication leads to organizations that are very sensitive to
changes in fundamental parameters. A minor change in one of the parameters may lead from
one mode of organizational design to another and we have ventured the possibility that this
with “non programmed” means of coordination, such as autonomy of the staﬀ and mutual adjustment, whereas
low uncertainty correlates positively with programmed means (use of rules, authority, and scheduled meetings.)
32On average, US ﬁrms exhibit more workﬂow rigidity than their Japanese counterparts.
34is the mechanism at work in the recent wave of reengineering and transformations observed in
the ﬁrms of developed economies.
Importantly, the endogeneity of the demand for coordination oﬀers a more subtle picture
of some classic results in the literature. First, specialization is not monotonic in the importance
of task interdependence. If task interdependence becomes more important, the organization
may abandon adaptability altogether, exploit the specialization gains to the fullest, and ensure
coordination by limiting the employee’s discretion, that is, by coordinating ex-ante. In this case
then, more interdependence leads to more specialization, not less. Second, specialization is not
monotonic in improvements in communication technology. In the presence of this improvement
it pays to be more adaptive and this increases the demand for coordination. Organizations
may meet this additional demand for coordination by decreasing specialization rather than
increasing it, and, in this case improvements in communication are accompanied by broader
job descriptions and enhanced employee discretion.
Throughout the paper we have maintained a team-theoretic framework in which agents
share the same organizational goal. While we believe this is a necessary ﬁr s ts t e p ,w ea r ew e l l
aware that career concerns and the need to provide individualized incentives may interfere
with the objectives of adaptation and coordination. Agents with paternalistic objectives, for
example, are unlikely to fully internalize the coordination problems their actions entail for
other agents. This may result in over-adaptation. Similarly, if communication is privately
costly, agents are likely to underinvest in improving coordination. This moral hazard problem
may result in sub-optimal levels of communication. The study of coordination in the presence
of incentive conﬂicts is the topic of our current research.
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38APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1: Clearly the choice of aji for j ∈ T (i),j6= i or j/ ∈ T (i) when the agent in
charge of task j observes aii is aji = aii. When instead the agent in charge of task j/ ∈ T (i) does not





and the solution is aji = E
¡
aii¢
. The choice of aii





















































Adding up over i, substracting h(t,α) and δg(p) a n da d d i n gu po v e ri yields Π(p,t). ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
Preliminaries
Deﬁne
π (b p,t)=m a x
p≥b p
Π(p,t)
T h ec h o i c eo fb p then does not aﬀect the optimal choice of the other design variables as, given the strict
quasiconcavity of the proﬁt function, the highest optimal value of b p is always chosen to be equal to
p∗ (t), the unique equilibrium value for the quality of communication. With some abuse of notation,
deﬁne e p(t) as the value of the constrained maximization of the proﬁt function,
e p(t)=
(
p∗ (t) if p∗ (t) > b p
b p if p∗ (t) ≤ b p
.
Recall as well that we have assumed that Π(p,t) is a strictly quasiconcave function of p. Π(p,t,τ)
is a diﬀerentiable function of p and, as a consequence, it follows that p∗ (t) is the solution of Πp (p,t)=0 ,
where
Πp (p,t)=−δn(n − t)gp (p) − n
µ
φ




where Bp (t)=−β (n − t). In addition, recall that we have assumed that
gp (0) = 0 and limp→1gp (p)=∞.
It follows that p∗ (t) is unique, strictly in the interior of [0,1], and diﬀerentiable with respect to any of





. Finally notice that,
39Bb p (t)=
(
0 if p∗ (t) > b p
−β (n − t) if p∗ (t) ≤ b p
≤ 0,
The following lemma plays an important role in what follows.




≥ e p(t) for t>tand t,t ∈ J
Proof: Clearly it is enough to show that p∗ (¯ t) >p ∗ (t). Then
0=Πp (p∗ (t),t)
=( n − t)
(
−δngp (p∗ (t)) + nβ
µ
φ






























































<B(p∗ (t),t). The result now follows
from the strict quasiconcavity of Π(p,t,τ). ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
(i) To prove this part of the proposition we make use of standard results on supermodularity. By The-
orem 1 of Milgrom and Roberts (1990),33 af u n c t i o n  : Rm → R that is supermodular when exclusively




supermodular. Our strategy of proof is then to show that the cross derivative of the function π(b p,t,τ)





as an additional argument in
the function. Throughout we appeal to the envelope theorem and “ignore” the impact of the variation
on, say, τ on p∗ (t,τ) whenever p∗ (t,τ) > b p. Also notice that whenever p∗ (t,τ) ≤ b p the constrained




τ if p∗ (t,τ) > b p
0 if p∗ (t,τ) ≤ b p
We prove the properties with respect to φ,t h ep r o o fw i t hr e s p e c tt o−α and σ2
θ being identical
in its logic.
Complementarity between b p and t : Deﬁne
33Milgrom and Roberts (1995) oﬀer a transparent primer on the mathematics of supermodularity. For a





− π(b p,t,φ) for t>t and t,t ∈ J








> b p>e p(t), then ∆b p =
−πb p (b p,t,φ) > 0, by the strict quasiconcavity of the proﬁt function and the fact that b p>e p(t). Asume




> e p(t). In this case,




























































































































Complementarity between b p and φ : In this case,
πb pφ = −2nφσ2
θBb p
"





where e pφ > 0 if p∗ (t,τ) > b p, as it follows from applying the implicit function theorem to Πp (p,t)=0 ,
and e pφ =0if p∗ (t,τ) ≤ b p.















































(ii) This follows immediately from Lemma I and (i) above.
(iii) Denote t1 = t∗(β
1) and t2 = t∗(β
2) with β
1 6= β
2. Assume that t2 >t 1.Let e p1(t) denote the
optimized value of p given β
1 and t ∈ J,a n dl e te p2(t) denote the optimized value of p given β
2 and
t ∈ J. From Lemma I, it follows that e p2 ¡
t2¢
> e p2 ¡
t1¢
. In addition, from A1, for any δ>0 there
41exists an ε>0 such that whenever
¯ ¯β
2 − β
1¯ ¯ <ε ,then
¯ ¯e p2(t) − e p1(t)
¯ ¯ <δ .It follows that there exists
an ε>0 such that whenever
¯ ¯β
2 − β
1¯ ¯ <ε ,p ∗(β
2)=e p2 ¡
t2¢




P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 : As β −→ ∞ the organization will ﬁnd it necessary to achieve perfect
coordination in equilibrium, that is for all i,j aji = aii. Given that p<1 and t<n ,t h i si m p l i e st h a t
aji = aii = ˆ θ
ii
. However, whenever aji = aii = ˆ θ
ii
for all i,j, positive returns to specialization imply
that it will be optimal to choose t =1 . Hence, as β −→ ∞ either t = ˆ t or t =1 . Obviously, if φ tends
to 0, t∗ =1will be optimal, whereas t∗ = ˆ t will be optimal whenever φ tends to ∞. Moreover, if t∗ = ˆ t
for φ
0 then also t∗ = ˆ t for φ>φ
0. This proves part (a) of the proposition. Finally, if given α = α0 for
φ = φ
0, then the organization is indiﬀerent between setting t∗ =1and setting t∗ = ˆ t then for α>α 0
the organization must strictly prefer t =1which implies the second part of the proposition. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 :We have that limδ−→∞ p∗ =0 , where p∗ is the equilibrium level of commu-







θ − n(n − t)δg(p) − nh(t,α)
















Since the ﬁrst term between parenthesis is both strictyly increasing in φ and in t, it follows that there
exists a φ
0 such that the solution equals 1 if and only if φ ≤ φ
0. If an increase in α increases h(t,α) for
all values of t except t =1 , then φ is increasing in α. ¤




t h ee x p e c t e dc o s tf u n c t i o na s s o c i a t e dw i t ht a s ki, conditional
on the management’s information at the interim stage, that is conditional on εi, when management





cost function conditional on the managemet’s information at the interim stage when management decides















θ + ωm+ I (m)+δ (n − t)g(p)
where the term I (m) is the cost associated with intervention. If management decides not to intervene
and update the rules associated with task i, the organization saves managerial intervention costs I (m),
























, that is, management
intervenes whenever,










which concludes the proof of Lemma 8. (b) This follows immediately from the expression for b. ¤
Proof of Lemma 9: Recall that Pi = prob
£¯ ¯εi¯ ¯ ≥ b
¤




=( 1 − P)E
¡
Ci |





¯ ¯εi¯ ¯ ≥ b
¢
= δ (n − t)g(p)+ωm

































¯ ¯εi¯ ¯ ≥ b
i
,
the results follows. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 0
Preliminaries
Recall that the second period proﬁt function is given by,








. The following Lemma, which is given without proof, is the counterpart to Lemma
I above and we use it repeatedly in the proof of Proposition 10.




≥ e p(t) for t>tand (b) e pb > 0.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 0
To show (i) and (ii) it is enough to prove that, say,
π(b p,t,b,−m,−α),
is supermodular, the proof with respect to σ2
θ and ω being identical in the logic and mechanics. Impor-
tantly in what follows, it is easy to check that the optimal level of the quality of the communication,
p∗ is independent of m, the size of the managerial force, and −α.














¯ ¯εi¯ ¯ <b
i
.
43Complementarity between b p and b:I nt h i sc a s e















¯ ¯εi¯ ¯ <b
io
> 0.34
Complementarity between b p and −m : πb p(−m) =0 .
Complementarity between b p and −α : πb p(−α) =0 .








































¯ ¯εi¯ ¯ <b
io
> 0,
w h e r ew eh a v em a d eu s eo ft h ee n e v e l o p et h e o r e mt oi g n o r et h ee ﬀect of variation in b in e p.



















− h(t,α) > 0,
as, by our assumptions, htα > 0.
Complementarity between b and −m : πb(−m) = PbIm > 0, as recall that hm < 0.
Complementarity between b and −α : πb(−α) =0 .
Complementarity between −m and −α : π(−m)(−α) =0 .
This concludes the proof of Proposition 10. ¤
34Clearly Bb pBe p =0so the term in Be p can be ignored.
44P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 1
Preliminaries
Start by deﬁning,











p∗ (t,x) if p∗ (t,x) > b p
b p if p∗ (t,x) ≤ b p
,
where p∗ (t,x) is deﬁned as the solution to the ﬁrst order condition
0=−δn(n − t)gp (p) − nq (x)
µ
φ




Then we prove the following Lemma.




≥ e p(t,x) for t>t , t,t ∈ J and (b) e p(t,x) ≥ e p(t,x) > 0 for x>x .
Proof: The proof of part (a) is identical to that of Lemma I. As for (b), it is enough to prove the result


































and thus p∗ (t,x) >p= p∗ (t,x). ¤
The logic of the proof of Proposition 11 is identical to that of Proposition 3. As before as well we
appeal to the envelope theorem and “ignore” the impact of the variation on, say, τ on p∗ (t,τ) whenever
p∗ (t,τ) > b p.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 1
(i) We prove the result for the case where τ = −λ. The proof for the rest of the parameters is identical.





− π(b p,t,x,−λ) for t>t and t,t ∈ J
That ∆b p ≥ 0 then is identical to the case of Proposition 3.
Complementarity between b p and x : Deﬁne
∆(b p)=π(b p,t,x,−λ) − π(b p,t,x,−λ) for x>x
45Notice that if e p(t,x) > e p(t,x) ≥ b p, then, trivially ∆b p =0 . Next if, by Lemma III, e p(t,x) ≥ b p>e p(t,x),
then
∆b p = δn(n − t)gp (b p)+nq(x)
µ
φ
φ + β (n − t)(1− b p)
¶2
Bb pσ2
θ = −Πp (b p,t,x,τ) > 0,
by the strict quasiconcavity Π(p,t,x,τ) and b p>e p(t,x). Finally, if b p ≥ e p(t,x) > e p(t,x) then
∆b p = −n(q (x) − q (x))
µ
φ




as Bb p < 0 and q (x) >q(x).
Complementarity between b p and −λ : πb p(−λ) =0 .





− π(b p,t,x,−λ) for t>t and t,t ∈ J



















φ + B (e p(t,x),t)
)
> 0,














− π(b p,t,x,−λ) for t>t and t,t ∈ J
Then clearly,
∆(−λ) =0 .
Complementarity between x and −λ : πx(−λ) = Cxλ > 0.
(ii) This follows immediately from (i) and the fact that qx > 0. ¤
46Table 1: Organizational change in Britain
(Source: Caroli and Van Reenen (2001))
Have more or less responsibility
Non-Manual Manual
More Same Less D/K
.462 .465 .029 .045
More Same Less D/K
.328 .571 .064 .036
Eﬀect on range of tasks performed
Non-Manual Manual
Wider Same Narrower D/K
.625 .281 .058 .030
Wider Same Narrower D/K
.395 .450 .133 .020
Notes to Table 1: Answers given by senior management to questions concerning organizational
change asked in the 1984 WIRS. The questions were asked only if some organizational change had
taken place in the last three years. For instance, 46.2 of senior managers responded that workers
had more responsibility following organizational change. D/K: don’t know or not answered
47Table 2: IT and the division of labor
(Source Brynjolﬀson and Hitt (1998))
Variable IT Capital MIPS TOTPC % Comp. % Email Comp.
Self man. teams .17∗∗∗ .22∗∗∗ .20∗∗∗ .17∗∗∗ .27∗∗∗ .18∗∗∗
Broad jobs .07 .12∗∗∗ .10∗∗∗ .20∗∗∗ .17∗∗∗ .24∗∗∗
Notes to Table 2: Correlation coeﬃcients. Data from Computer Intelligence. IT Capital: Total
purchase value of computer equipment (mainframes, minicomputers and peripherals) during the
period 1991-1994. MIPS: Total processing power of central processors, measured in millions of
instructions per second. TOTPC: Total number of personal computers in use at the ﬁrm. Com-
puter Intelligence Inforcorp database details IT spending by site for companies in the Fortune
1000 companies. Survey questions: % Comp (% Email) is the answer to “What fraction of your
employees uses general purpose computer (E-mail) in the course of their regular work?” in the
survey conducted by Brynjolﬀson and Hitt (1998). Self man. teams: “Would you say your ﬁrm
uses self-managing teams very heavily, heavily, moderately, or slightly?” Broad jobs: “How would
you rate the amount of diversity associated with production work itself, very high, moderately
high, medium, moderately low, or very low?” *** denotes signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Table 3: Specialization and task interdependence in the US and Japan








Notes to Table 3: Regression of the Aston specialization scale (see Pugh et al. (1968)) on plant
attributes. US/Japan dummy takes the value 1 if the establishment is in the US. Ind. Company
is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the plant is a stand alone and 0 if it is a branch plant
or subsidiary. Size denotes the number of employees in the plant. Task interdependence is the
Aston workﬂow rigidity scale and characterize both rigidity and task interdependence. * denotes
signiﬁcance at the 10% and *** denotes signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
48Table 4: Zero order correlation among independent variables and coordination modes
(Source: van de Ven, Delbeq, and Koenig (1976))
1234567 8 9 1 0 1 1
1. Task Uncertainty
2. Task interdependence .37
3. Unit size -.14 -.12
4. Impersonal coordination -.49 -.26 .29
5. Rules and procedures -.46 -.22 .16 .78
6. Plans and schedules -.36 -.23 .25 .75 .49
7. Personal coordination .35 .20 .03 .00 -.05 -.04
8. Vertical channels .04 .06 .11 .31 .27 .23 .74
9. Horizontal channels .52 .23 -.06 -.30 -.34 -.28 .75 .13
10. Group coordination .64 .41 -.15 -.32 -.32 -.26 .42 .11 .52
11. Scheduled meetings .59 .41 -.08 -.27 -.27 -.22 .36 .17 .37 .88
12. Unscheduled meetings .64 .32 -.16 -.33 -.33 -.28 .35 .02 .51 .89 .66
Table 5: Multiple regression analysis
(Source: Van de Ven, Delbeq, and Koenig (1976))
Dependent Variable Task uncertainty Task interdependence Unit size R2 (%)
A. Impersonal mode -.44 (.06) -.07 (.06) .22 (.06) 30
1. Rules and Proc. -.43 (.07) -.05 (.07) .10 (.06) 23
2. Plans and Schd. -.20 (.07) -.09 (.07) .20 (.06) 8
B. Personal mode -.33 (.06) .08 (.06) .07 (.06) 14
1. Vertical chann. .03 (.08) .07 (.08) .13 (.07) 2
2. Horizontal chann. .51 (.07) .04 (.06) .01 (.06) 28
C. Group mode .57 (.06) .19 (.05) -.05 (.06) 45
1. Sched. meetings .48 (.06) .23 (.06) -.03 (.05) 39










FIGURE I: Example 2. Equilibrium level of the quality of task bundling, t,a saf u n c -
tion of importance of adaptation, φ. The thick line denotes the case where p is chosen
endogenously whereas the discontinous line denotes the case where p is exogenously set.
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FIGURE II - Panel A: Example 3. Equilibrium level of the quality of horizontal
communication, p, and task bundling, t, as a function of task interdependence, β.
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FI G U R EI I-P a n e lB :E x a m p l e3 .Equilibrium level of employee discretion per unit
of σ2
θ, that is, σ2 ¡
aii¢
/σ2
θ, as a function of task interdependence, β.
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FIGURE III: Example 4. Equilibrium level of the quality of horizontal communication,
p, and task bundling, t, as a function of communication costs, δ.
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